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Abstract: A parsimonious theoretical model of second degree price discrimination suggests that the 
business cycle will affect the degree to which firms are able to price-discriminate between different 
consumer types. We analyze price dispersion in the airline industry to assess how price discrimination 
can expose airlines to aggregate-demand fluctuations. Performing a panel analysis on seventeen years 
of data covering two business cycles, we find that price dispersion is highly procyclical. Estimates 
show that a rise in the output gap of 1 percentage point is associated with a 1.9 percent increase in 
the interquartile range of the price distribution in a market. These results suggest that markups move 
procyclically in the airline industry, such that during booms in the cycle, firms can significantly raise 
the markup charged to those with a high willingness to pay. The analysis suggests that this impact on 
firms’ ability to price-discriminate results in additional profit risk, over and above the risk that comes 
from variations in cost. 
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Firms can expose themselves to °uctuations in demand by choosing speci¯c pricing
strategies. In this study, our aim is to better understand how price discriminatory
tactics can make airlines vulnerable to aggregate demand risk. Given the large number
of bankruptcies in this industry, there is reason to believe that airlines are particularly
sensitive to movements in the business cycle. However, while many of the traditional,
legacy airlines, including United Airlines, U.S. Airways, and Delta Airlines, have been
forced to ¯le bankruptcy, a select group, known as low-cost carriers (LCCs) have been
able to stay pro¯table. The success of these LCCs has been impressive considering the
extreme pro¯t volatility that most airlines have had to endure during the post-regulation
era.
While di®erences in cost likely play an important role in the variation in pro¯ts across
airlines, we focus on a di®erent potential explanation for the volatile nature of airline
pro¯ts. We argue that price discrimination is a pricing strategy that accentuates pro¯t
variation over the business cycle. Price discrimination is a risky tactic in the sense that it
exposes the ¯rm to aggregate-demand movements and therefore induces greater revenue
°uctuations. We ¯nd that relative to LCCs, legacy carriers price discriminate to a large
degree, inducing high volatility in revenues. As legacy airlines generally have higher cost
levels than LCCs, our results imply that legacy carriers' large revenue variation has been
a major contributor to the large number of bankruptcies.
Price discrimination is a well-known strategy that airlines use to try to increase
pro¯ts. It involves charging higher prices to those consumers with a lower price elasticity
of demand, or equivalently, with a higher willingness-to-pay for an airline ticket. In this
manner, airlines are able to increase the average markup of prices to marginal cost, and
thus, increase their pro¯ts. In order to price discriminate, however, airlines must be able
to identify and separate consumers with di®erent willingness-to-pay, which they do by
o®ering tickets with various types of restrictions so that consumers separate themselves
through the ticket choices that they make (this type of self-selection is referred to as
second-degree price discrimination). In this paper we present empirical evidence that
suggests price discrimination in the airline industry is highly pro-cyclical. During booms
it is easier for airlines to price discriminate between consumers, while in business cycle
1troughs it is much more di±cult. This results in pro-cyclical average markups, and hence
pro-cyclical airline pro¯ts. Furthermore, it suggests that airlines which rely more heavily
on price discrimination strategies should expect more volatile pro¯ts over the business
cycle.
To help understand this aspect of airline pricing behavior, we develop a simple the-
oretical model of second-degree price discrimination based on Mussa and Rosen (1978).
The model shows that as long as consumers have diminishing marginal utility of in-
come, pro¯t-maximizing behavior on the part of ¯rms will result in the degree of price
discrimination covarying positively with aggregate income, and thus the business cycle.
Speci¯cally, during booms in the cycle, the di®erence between incentive compatible prices
charged to high- and low-income consumers is expected to increase, while during troughs
in the cycle the di®erence is expected to decrease.
One signi¯cant obstacle to overcome in the empirical analysis is the fact that price
discrimination is di±cult to identify and measure. We do not have access to data with
enough information about consumer and ticket characteristics to identify precise in-
stances of price discrimination and to directly study how price discrimination evolves
over time. Instead, we adopt the strategy of the previous literature and use price dis-
persion at the airline-route level to proxy for price discrimination. In particular, we look
at how various measures of price dispersion are correlated with the business cycle, while
controlling for variation in price dispersion that is likely due to other factors, such as
competition and cost.
Using a relatively long panel dataset on ticket prices, which spans almost two full
business cycles, we ¯nd evidence that price dispersion is highly procyclical, corroborat-
ing the mechanism delineated in the simple pricing model. We interpret this ¯nding
as evidence that during booms in the business cycle airlines are able to exploit larger
di®erences in willingness-to-pay between di®erent types of consumers (i.e. business and
leisure travelers), which allows them to raise the markup charged to more price inelastic
consumers. This story is consistent with the highly procyclical nature of pro¯ts in the
airline industry as seen in Figure 1.
In addition, this ¯nding suggests that the business cycle induces signi¯cant °uctu-
ations in airline pro¯ts, over and above variations in cost. As markups are tied to the
2degree to which an airline can successfully price discriminate, recessions signi¯cantly
hinder this pro¯table pricing mechanism, while booms accentuate it. This story is con-
sistent with the observation that the airlines with the highest within-route variance in
price dispersion are the same airlines that have the highest variability in pro¯ts as seen
in Figure 2. Thus, our analysis suggests that those airlines that rely more on price dis-
crimination techniques will face greater pro¯t risk stemming from the business cycle. It
is apparent from Figure 2 that the four largest LCCs (Southwest, JetBlue, Frontier, and
AirTran) are characterized by low price dispersion as well as low pro¯t volatility in our
sample. This suggests that ¯rms relying more on price discrimination techniques have
had more variable pro¯ts.
This study is related to numerous microeconomic studies on pricing strategies and
business cycle conditions. For instance, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) theorize that,
during booms ¯rms may be less likely to collude since the bene¯ts of cheating are higher,
causing ¯rms to cut prices. Another set of theories, based on switching costs and brand
loyalty, show that during booms new customers may enter the market causing demand
to become more elastic and ¯rms to lower prices (see Bils (1989), Klemperer (1995), and
Stiglitz (1984)). A third theory, put forth by Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984) and
analyzed by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996), shows that during recessions cash-strapped
¯rms may forego o®ering low prices to attract new customers in order to generate a higher
cash °ow.
This study also provides potentially interesting insights to macroeconomists who have
had a longstanding interest in the cyclicality of markups. In macroeconomic models of
perfect competition, °uctuations in aggregate demand do not shift the labor demand
schedule. Thus, in order to generate movements in employment, the models rely on
outward shifts in the labor supply curve (see Hall 1980). To generate labor demand
shifts, models of imperfect competition (for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1992),
Goodfriend and King (1997)) were developed which introduced an endogenous variable,
the markup of price over marginal cost.1 In particular, a countercyclical markup will act
in a similar manner to a positive productivity shock during booms in the business cycle,
1Including labor hoarding in the framework as in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1993) has also
been a way to explain procyclical labor productivity.
3shifting the labor demand curve out and raising real wages.2 Our estimates provide some
evidence against this hypothesis, at least as an exhaustive possibility.
Although our empirical analysis is con¯ned to one industry, the model indicates
that the procyclicality of markups is likely to occur in many other industries as well.
Speci¯cally, as diminishing marginal utility of income is inclusive to a broad class of
utility speci¯cations, procyclical markup variation should occur in industries in which
¯rms have market power and can successfully price discriminate. Researchers have found
many other industries in which ¯rms have been successful at price discrimination such as
hotels, stadiums, restaurants, theaters (Leslie 2004), yellow-page advertising (Busse and
Rysman 2005), cement (Miller and Osborne 2010) and personal computers (Aizcorbe
and Shapiro 2010).
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical framework by
which price discrimination can lead to procyclical markup variation. Section 3 discusses
possible e®ects of cost on price dispersion. Section 4 contains a detailed discussion of
the data. In Section 5 we perform a ¯xed-e®ects, panel estimation of the relationship
between price dispersion and various proxies for the business cycle. Finally, Section 6
contains concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Framework
Price dispersion at the °ight level is a common characteristic of the airline industry,
and one of the leading explanations for such dispersion is the practice of price discriminat-
ing among di®erent types of consumers. It is well known that airlines implement second-
and third-degree price discrimination in which they segment heterogeneous groups of
consumers and charge them distinct prices for essentially the same product. Advance-
purchase requirements, non-refundable tickets, and Saturday-night layovers are a few
examples of restrictions that airlines use to identify passengers with di®erent price elas-
ticities of demand. Since high-income or business consumers tend to place a high value
on their time, they are more likely to purchase more expensive tickets without such re-
2Other research in this area includes Gali (1994), Edmunds and Veldkamp (2006), and Jaimovich
(2007).
4strictions. By making use of these techniques, airlines are able to separate price-sensitive
travelers from price-insensitive travelers.
According to a 1993 Gallup Survey, 49% of air travel in the U.S. was for business, and
those respondents cited a rise in new business activity or improved ¯nancial conditions in
their respective ¯rms as the primary reason for increased business travel (Busse, 2002).3
This suggests that when aggregate demand conditions are good, high-income or business
consumers have higher demand for air travel, and are also more likely to pay higher
prices for tickets characterized by less restrictions and preferred °ight times. Thus, during
periods of high aggregate demand, carriers will likely experience both a higher proportion
of price inelastic travelers demanding tickets, and an increase in the willingness-to-pay for
those price inelastic consumers. If the fraction of tickets sold to price inelastic consumers
increases and the di®erence in ticket prices between price inelastic consumers and price
elastic travelers increases in periods of high aggregate demand, then both the average
markup and price dispersion will follow the business cycle.
We illustrate this relationship between price discrimination and the business cycle
with a simple model of monopoly pricing. With the model we derive the precise con-
dition on preferences that ensures a positive correlation between price discrimination
and the business cycle. While an oligopolistic model would prove more realistic, it also
complicates the analysis and moves away from the scope of the empirical study|the
e®ect of aggregate conditions on airline pricing patterns. Furthermore, in the empirical
analysis we control for variations in competition over time, and thus any e®ect of the
business cycle on prices, in a dynamic sense, will be measured in a setting where the
degree of competition is held ¯xed. One could extend our theoretical framework to an
oligopolistic game by adding a horizontal dimension on the consumer's valuation of the
product (e.g. brand) as in spatial models such as Schmalensee (1978), Salop (1979)
and Brito (2003). Such brand di®erentiation would allow ¯rms to compete in price and
also have some degree of market power. One should therefore think of the theoretical
model below as a market in which brand preference is strong enough to allow ¯rms to
price above marginal cost, and that consumers' preferences over brand are distributed
3On the °ip side, respondents who indicated less business travel attributed it to decreasing business
activity or bad ¯nancial conditions in their respective ¯rms.
5independently of income.
2.1 Consumers
We consider a model with multiple types of consumers, where consumers di®er in their




d ¢ xv + u(m) (1)
subject to:
yi = m + d ¢ p
where xv is valuation of the ticket where v 2 1;2 indicates its attributes. For instance,
v = 2 indicates a ticket that has an advance purchase requirement or saturday-night
stayover requirement, while v = 1 indicates a less restrictive ticket. It follows that with
positive time costs, the net quality of v = 1 will be higher than that of v = 2 such
that x1 > x2. The variable m represents the numeraire commodity and d represents the
consumer's decision to buy or not buy the good. Note that u(¢) is the functional form
representing the manner in which the consumer values the numeraire commodity relative
to the discrete good. It follows that the indirect utility function for the case in which
the consumer purchases the discrete good (d = 1) is given by:
U = xv + u(yi ¡ p): (2)
As in Tirole (1988), we make the assumption that a consumer's income is very large
relative to the valuation, xv, and subsequently to the equilibrium price charged. This
allows us to take a Taylor expansion around p¤ = 0 which, under the assumption that
yi ¡ p ¼ yi, yields:
U = xv + u(yi) ¡ u
0(yi)p: (3)
It follows that for a given consumer to be better o® consuming the good, it must be
the case that xv + u(yi) ¡ u0(yi)p ¸ u(yi), which means demand for the good is:
6di(pv) =
(
1 if pv · xv
u0(yi)




To simplify the ¯rm's problem we assume two types of consumers: a high income
consumer with income yh and a low income consumer with income yl. The ¯rm's problem
in the two-consumer-type case is to maximize pro¯ts given consumer demand derived
above. The ¯rm has the option to separate the market by o®ering di®erent types of
tickets. To obtain a separating equilibrium, the ¯rm must be able to separate the market




1 = bhx1 ¡ (bh ¡ bl)x2 (5)
p
¤
2 = blx2: (6)
where bh = 1
u0(yh) and bl = 1
u0(yl). As the high-income consumer values x2 more than
the low-income consumer, the ¯rm must lower the price of x1 to dissuade the high-
income consumer from deviating and purchasing x2. Speci¯cally, the bound is lowered
by the extra utility the high-income consumer would have received over the low-income
consumer by consuming x2, (bh¡bl)x2. This lowering of the price ensures that the high-
income consumer does not purchase x2 instead of x1 (this ensures that the equilibrium is
incentive compatible). In either case, the ¯rm will ¯nd it pro¯t-maximizing to separate
the market as long as the number of low-income consumers is su±ciently large (see Tirole
(1988)).
Note that the price range between the high and low price ticket (a simple measure of
price dispersion) will be:
D = p1 ¡ p2 = bh(x1 ¡ x2): (7)
An interesting result is that the level of dispersion does not depend on the low-income
consumer's marginal utility of income; only the high-income consumer. This outcome is
7attributable to the incentive compatibility constraint. In particular, if the ¯rm is able
to raise the price charged to a low-income consumer (without exceeding the low-income
consumer's reservation price), then the ¯rm can safely transfer this price rise on to the
high-income consumer (without providing an incentive to the high-income consumer to
choose the low-quality ticket). It follows that the elasticity of price dispersion relative














which is simply the coe±cient of relative risk aversion (CRA). As long as the CRA is
positive (i.e. diminishing marginal utility of income), price dispersion will widen with
an increase in aggregate income. Thus, under very general conditions on the consumer's
utility of income, price dispersion will follow aggregate income.4
To show the linkage between price dispersion and markups we ¯rst denote the average
markup as:
¹ ¹ = ®h ¤ ¹1 + (1 ¡ ®h) ¤ ¹2 (9)
where ®h is the proportion of high-income consumers purchasing tickets and ¹v = pv¡cv
is the markup charged on ticket of type v with marginal cost cv. Assuming that marginal
costs do not covary with aggregate demand, it follows from (8) and (9) that the ratio
of the markups charged to each type of consumer,
¹1
¹2, will rise with aggregate demand,
and so will the average markup.
Overall, the model indicates that, ceterus paribus, procyclical price dispersion is
indicative of a procyclical average markup. It is this relationship between price dispersion
and aggregate demand that we will explore in the airline ticket price data. In particular,
we will study the cyclicality of markups in the airline industry using price dispersion as a
proxy for average markups. If the model assumptions are reasonable, then we expect to
¯nd a positive correlation between price dispersion and aggregate demand. This linkage
4It is also relevant to note from (7) that dispersion will also be procyclical if x1¡x2 follows aggregate
income. Thus, price dispersion will be cyclical if time costs are also cyclical. This implies that the e®ect
of aggregate income on price dispersion will be pronounced if nonrestrictive tickets become more valuable
during booms in the cycle.
8of price dispersion and markup variation, however, is dependent on the assumption that
marginal cost does not vary with the business cycle. We address this issue in the following
section.
3 Capacity and Marginal Cost
There are two issues we need to address before proceeding. First, if the carrier
is constrained by capacity, then as more °ights reach full capacity, the expense of an
additional passenger becomes very large as either a bigger aircraft or an extra °ight is
needed to supply the extra seat-mile. Eden (1990) shows that e®ect can induce price
dispersion to rise in periods of peak demand when full capacity is reached. Second, wages
of crew and maintenance workers are apt to rise during booms in the cycle, which would
cause marginal costs to rise. Thus, even if price dispersion is procyclical, markups may
not necessarily be. We address these two possibilities in this section.
3.1 E®ective Capacity Cost
In discussing the e®ect of capacity constraints on pricing, it is useful to decompose
marginal cost into its two primary components, which we refer to as the passenger cost
and the capacity cost. If the aircraft is not operating at full capacity, then marginal
cost is simply equal to the passenger cost; the cost of adding an additional passenger
to the airplane. This cost is mostly made up of the extra fuel required to transport
the additional weight of the passenger, while other, lesser components include the in-
°ight costs of serving the additional passenger ( i.e. meals, snacks, etc.). However, if
the airplane is operating at full capacity, then marginal cost is equal to the direct cost
of an additional passenger as well as the more substantial cost of an additional °ight.
This cost is incurred regardless of whether or not seats on the airplane are ¯lled with
passengers, while the passenger cost is only incurred on seats that are sold. This implies





¯ij; if capacity is not reached
¯ij + ¸ij; if capacity is reached
where ¯ij is the passenger cost of serving an additional passenger one mile on route j by
carrier i, and ¸ij is the cost of an additional °ight (in seat-miles).
If airlines price according to stochastic demand concerns, then aggregate demand
could alter the ¯rm's expected probability of selling a ticket, and subsequently alter
the \e®ective" capacity cost. In particular, if ex-ante the carrier is uncertain about the
level demand for a °ight, then under price-setting commitments and costly capacity,
pro¯t-maximizing behavior induces a distribution of prices rather than a single price.
The intuition is that if the ¯rm were allowed to change price after the realization of the
state, then it would set a low price in the low-demand state and a high price in the
high-demand state. However, because the ¯rm must commit to a menu of prices ex-ante,
its pro¯t maximizing strategy is to assign multiple prices to speci¯ed quantities of the
good.5 That is, if a ¯rm must pay costs irrespective of whether or not its output is sold,
then it has a large incentive to set higher prices on goods that are less likely to be sold.6
Eden (1990) formalized a model in a setting of perfect competition where there is
uncertainty regarding the number of agents who will show up to exchange goods in the
marketplace. In such a setting, goods are characterized by the probability that they will
be sold, and in equilibrium ¯rms face a tradeo® between price and the probability of
sale. In the model, equilibrium prices are given by the condition,
5It should be pointed out that more a subtle factor is also needed to induce such pricing behavior by
¯rms. The ¯rm's ex-post optimal price must be positively correlated with the level of demand (Dana
1999, 2001). That is, if the ¯rm's optimal price in the high-demand state is larger than it's optimal
price in the low-demand state, then it should use multiple prices to achieve some of the bene¯ts that it
would have if it were able to adjust price in response to demand. If instead, the ex-post optimal price
is constant or decreasing in demand, the ¯rm's optimal strategy will be to set one price.
6Prescott (1975), was the ¯rst study to address this issue in the economics literature. His paper was
more focussed on the theory of unemployment, and his model was more of an example rather than a
formal model of pricing.
10ps = ¯ +
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where ps is the price of the sth good, ¯ is an operating cost that the ¯rm must pay for
each good that it sells, ¸ is the unit capacity cost, and prob(sale) is the probability that
good s is sold. The second term on the right-hand side of the equation can be interpreted
as an \e®ective" capacity cost of good s, ¸eff
s . In competitive equilibrium, it is the case
that ¯rms are indi®erent between selling a high-priced good with low probability and
selling a low-priced good with high probability. Dana (1999) extended Eden's model to
monopoly and oligopoly market structures. In this setting, the monopolist sets a higher
price for a good that sells only in high demand states since its e®ective cost is higher.7
Under this setting, where the carrier commits to prices ex-ante, the highest priced
tickets|tickets with the highest e®ective capacity cost|are not purchased until demand
rises su±ciently high to purchase all of the low priced tickets. Thus, if the carrier is pric-
ing solely with stochastic demand concerns, then peaks in aggregate demand will induce
higher price dispersion through the higher e®ective capacity cost of the remaining seats
on crowded aircrafts. In this case, it could be argued that procyclical price dispersion is
not evidence of a procyclical markup, it is evidence that the e®ective capacity cost rises
during periods of peak demand due to low available capacity.
While we believe that carriers do take e®ective capacity cost into account, we discount
its prominence in a®ecting price dispersion at the business cycle frequency. If stochastic
demand pricing was causing price dispersion to follow the business cycle, then aircraft
capacity utilization should covary positively with the business cycle. Figure 5 shows that
the mean aircraft capacity utilization rate has been steadily increasing over the course of
the sample period, and is not necessarily positively correlated with the business cycle.8
7Indirect evidence found by Stavins (1996) is consistent with stochastic demand pricing. Stavins
found that even controlling for advance purchase requirements, ticket prices increase as the number of
days to departure decreases.
8As a robustness check, we estimate an instrumental-variable ¯xed-e®ects regression, similar in fash-
ion to the estimator discussed in the next section. We estimated two simple regressions. First we
estimated the univariate regression: ln(util)ijt = ® + ¯1Y GAPt + °ij + "ijt, where utilijt is the uti-
lization rate (fraction of occupied seats) for carrier i on route j in quarter t. Second we estimated a
11Rather, there is signi¯cant seasonal variation in this variable, indicating that e®ective
capacity concerns are likely important at high frequency levels, but not necessarily at
middle and low frequency levels. Overall, this ¯gure makes it apparent that, at the
business cycle frequency, carriers are more likely altering capacity as opposed to letting
aircraft utilization vary. This is consistent with the ¯ndings by Puller, Sengupta and
Wiggins (2010).9
3.2 Marginal Cost
Marginal cost may vary over the business cycle for many reasons. For instance,
wages of pilots and °ight attendants may rise during booms, as may the price of fuel.
For this reason, in our empirical analysis below we proxy for variations in marginal
cost using a measure of the carrier's average variable cost. Numerous studies, such as
Caves, Christensen, and Trethaway (1984) and Gillen, Oum, and Tretheway (1985, 1990),
have found that the carriers' passenger output displays constant-returns-to-scale in ¯rm
size. This ¯nding suggests that average variable cost may be a valid approximation to
marginal cost in this context. The BTS's P-52 database de¯nes a measure called the
\total aircraft operating cost," which includes fuel, crew wages, maintenance, aircraft
leasing, and depreciation.10 This variable measures the tangible cost to the carrier of
operating in a given quarter.
Figure 4 plots this variable as a proportion of total seat-miles for four carriers in
our sample. The ¯gure shows that cost per seat-mile is correlated across ¯rms, and has
generally increased through the course of the sample period. As expected, Southwest and
JetBlue, the two largest LCCs in our sample, have lower cost levels than do the two legacy
regression controlling for competition: ln(util)ijt = ® + ¯1Y GAPt + ¯2 ln\ HHIij + °ij + "ijt, where
HHIjt is the Her¯ndahl Index associated with route j in quarter t (measured using passenger shares).
The coe±cient ¯1 is estimated to be -0.44 with a standard error of 0.04 in the ¯rst speci¯cation and
-0.43 with standard error 0.03 in the second. This negative coe±cient indicates that utilization moves
countercyclically.
9For robustness purposes, in our empirical analysis that follows we include aircraft utilization as a
control for e®ective capacity cost.
10As described in the next section, in the ¯xed-e®ects speci¯cation we decompose this variable between
its fuel component and its other components because fuel is relatively much more volatile.
12carriers, US Airways and United. This di®erentiation in cost between legacies and LCCs
is ubiquitous across the entire airline industry. The large rise and fall in costs in 2008
can be attributed to the spike in oil prices that occurred during that summer. Overall,
including a proxy for marginal cost in the empirical speci¯cation removes any variation
in price dispersion induced by tangible cost variations. This leaves the estimation of the
e®ect of the business cycle on prices in line with that of the simple model where marginal
cost is assumed to be constant.
4 Data
Our study focuses on domestic, direct, coach-class airline tickets over the period
1993q1 to 2009q4. Our sample includes nine major domestic airlines, often referred to
as \legacy carriers,"11 as well as a number of low-cost carriers12 (LCCs) and regional
carriers. Ticket prices represent 10-percent of all domestic tickets issued by airlines and
are obtained from the DB1B database. In addition to ticket prices, the DB1B includes
other quarterly itinerary information, such as origin and destination airports, passenger
quantities, number of stops (plane changes), and fare class.13 Tickets less then $20 are
believed to be frequent-°yer tickets and are eliminated.
The data is a panel, where an observation is a °ight conducted by a speci¯c air-
line, between an origin and destination airport (route), in a speci¯c time period (year
and quarter). For example, an American Airlines direct, coach-class ticket, from Dallas
(DFW) to San Francisco (SFO) in the ¯rst quarter of 1999 is considered an observation in
our data. The direct ticket data include both one-way °ights and round-trip °ights. The
DB1B contains numerous itineraries and fares for the same °ight by the same carrier,
11The legacy carriers in our sample include United, US Airways, Delta, American, Alaskan, TWA,
Continental, Northwest, and America West.
12The list of LCCs, obtained from Ito and Lee (2003), includes Air South, Access Air, AirTran,
American Trans Air, Eastwind, Frontier, JetBlue, Kiwi, Morris Air, National, Pro Air, Reno, Southwest,
Spirit, Sun Country, ValuJet, Vanguard, and Western Paci¯c. For a more detailed discussion of LCCs
see Goolsbee and Syverson (2008).
13There are three di®erent sub-components to the DB1B data set. They are market data, coupon
data, and ticket data; and we combine variables from all three. For further reference, see the BTS's
website http://www.transtats.bts.gov.
13re°ecting the quarterly frequency of the data, as well as the many di®erent fares found
within the same fare class, on the same °ight, at a given point in time. Thus, the data
comprise distributions of prices for carrier-route itineraries.14 Price dispersion is mea-
sured using three separate proxies: the interquartile range, the Gini coe±cient, and the
90th and 10th price percentiles estimated separately. The interquartile range and Gini
coe±cient are advantageous in that they summarize dispersion with one statistic, while
the price percentiles have the advantage that they provide more detailed information
about the tails of the distribution.
The median Gini coe±cient in our entire sample is 0.225, and is 0.217 for legacy
carriers and 0.171 for LCCs. To get a better handle on the dynamics of price dispersion,
we present a few graphical examples of the pricing patterns seen in the data. Figure 3
plots price percentiles of three routes along with a plot of the output gap.15 The top
two panels correspond to routes operated by two legacy carriers, American Airlines and
Delta Airlines, while the bottom panel consists of a route operated by Southwest Airlines.
It is noteworthy that in the legacy carrier panels, the higher price percentiles seem to
closely follow the output gap. The top portion of the price distribution rises and falls
with the boom in the late 1990s and then begins to gradually fall as aggregate demand
deteriorates. In contrast, we do not see the same relationship in the Southwest panel, as
none of the percentiles of the price distribution seem correlated with the output gap. In
the next section we conduct a more systematic analysis using panel data methods in an
e®ort to con¯rm these observations.
5 Estimation
We utilize the same empirical strategy as in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) to study
the relationship between price dispersion and the business cycle. Since the data is a
panel of airline-route observations, it is possible to assess the e®ects of business cycle
variations on price dispersion while holding ¯xed time-invariant, route-speci¯c factors,
14See Appendix B for more details on the construction of the dataset, and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009)
for an even more detailed description.
15The output gap is de¯ned as the log di®erence between the actual nominal GDP and the CBO's
measure of potential output.
14as well as any route-speci¯c variation in the degree of competition and carrier-speci¯c
variation in fuel and other operating costs. We use a ¯xed-e®ects panel estimator, which
exploits the times-series variation along a speci¯c route in the estimation routine. We
use two di®erent approaches in measuring the e®ect of business cycle variations on price
dispersion.
The model reviewed in Section 2 predicts that high-income consumers' price elasticity
of demand will be more sensitive to business cycle variations than that of low-income
consumers. Speci¯cally, equation (8) predicts that a rise in aggregate income will induce
a rise in price dispersion. This relationship can be formulated by the following empirical
speci¯cation:
DISPijt = µ0 +¯1 ¤Y GAPt +¯3 ¤ln [ HHIjt +¯4 ¤lnUTILijt +°
0 ¤Xit +°ij +"ijt: (11)
where i indexes the carrier, j the route, and t the time period. In this speci¯cation,
the output gap, Y GAPt is used to proxy for the business cycle, as measured by the
Congressional Budget O±ce (CBO). Carrier-route ¯xed e®ects are represented as °ij,
and [ HHIjt is the market concentration of the route as measured by the Her¯ndahl
index and is instrumented using the same variables as in Borenstein and Rose (1994)
and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009).16 We control for costs on a speci¯c carrier i with the
vector Xit, which includes the logarithm of the carrier's average fuel cost per gallon,
lnFUELit, as well as the remaining operating cost per seat-mile, lnCOSTit, measured
by the BTS for a speci¯c carrier. To control for e®ective capacity cost variations, we
include the logarithm of the utilization rate of carrier i on route j in period t.17
The second speci¯cation takes the form:
DISPijt = µ0 + ¯1 ¤ URjt + ¯2 ¤ ln [ HHIjt + ¯4 ¤ lnUTILijt + °
0 ¤ Xit + °ij + "ijt: (12)
16See the appendix for a description of the instruments .
17It is important to note that since this variable is endogenous, the estimate on ¯4 will be biased
downwards. For this reason, we do not report the estimate of ¯4. No results changed when we did not
include the utilization rate in the regression.
15where the average unemployment rate of the two endpoint states on the route, URjt,
is used as an alternative proxy for the business cycle. In both speci¯cations, price dis-
persion, DISPijt, is measured in three di®erent ways: the logarithm of the interquartile
range, the Gini log-odds ratio,18 and the 90th and 10th percentiles, each estimated in
separate regressions. Analyzing the top and bottom of the price distribution separately
provides additional information regarding the source of the change in price dispersion.
Observations are weighted by the total number of passengers on the route over the en-
tire sample period and standard errors are clustered by route in order to control for
autocorrelation as well as correlation between carriers on the same route.
6 Estimation Results
Table 1 contains estimation results for both speci¯cations, using the logarithm of the
interquartile range and the Gini log-odds ratio as the dependent variable. We report
results for all direct routes in our 17-year sample.19 The e®ect of a rise in the business
cycle|as measured by the output gap|on price dispersion is positive and signi¯cant at
the 1-percent signi¯cance level. The estimate indicates that a one percentage point rise in
the output gap (i.e. from 0.01 to 0.02) is associated with an increase in the interquartile
range by 1.88 percent and the Gini log odds by 0.012. The results from the second
speci¯cation are similar to the ¯rst, indicating that a decrease in the unemployment
rate induces an increase in the amount of price dispersion on a given route.20 A one
percentage point fall in the unemployment rate is associated with a 2.5 percent increase
in the interquartile range. These estimated coe±cients are suggestive of the existence of




produces an unbounded statistic. No results change when the log of the Gini coe±cient is used instead.
See Hayes and Ross (1998) for further discussion.
19This sample includes 154,333 carrier-route observations when using ln(IQR) as the dependent vari-
able and 155,961 carrier-route observations using the Gini log-odds ratio. The reason for the fewer
observations in the ¯rst speci¯cation is that observations in which the interquartile range was equal to
zero were necessarily dropped.
20This sample includes 153,706 carrier-route observations when using ln(IQR) as the dependent vari-
able and 155,331 carrier-route observations using the Gini log-odds ratio. We have fewer observations in
this speci¯cation because we do no have unemployment information for American Samoa or St. Thomas.
16procyclical markups in the airline industry.
A look at the estimates from the percentile regressions in Table 2 sheds further light
on the manner in which price dispersion follows the business cycle. The estimates show
that an increase in the output gap raises the 90th-percentile price level but has no
signi¯cant e®ect on the 10th-percentile price level. An increase in the output gap by one
percentage point is associated with a 1.35 percent increase in the 90th percentile price,
but is not correlated with the 10th percentile price. Similarly, a fall in the unemployment
rate by 1 percentage point is associated with a 1.6 percent increase in the 90th percentile
price, while there is statistically signi¯cant, but small -0.25 percent negative correlation
between the unemployment rate and the 10th percentile price. Thus, the estimates
are consistent with the interpretation that during booms in the business cycle, airlines
increase the extent to which they price discriminate by raising prices to those consumers
with the highest willingness-to-pay for air travel.21
As in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), we ¯nd that the e®ect of a decrease in competition|
as measured by an increase in market concentration ln [ HHI|on price dispersion is
positive and signi¯cant at the 1-percent signi¯cance level.22 There also appear to be
interesting dynamics occurring on the cost side. Fuel costs seem to ¯lter into the 10th
percentile prices and 90th percentile prices equally, while other operating costs ¯lter more
into the 90th percentile prices. There are many plausible stories that could explain this
result. One possibility may be that carriers simply ¯nd it easier to pass costs on to the
more price inelastic consumers as they are more likely to lose the less elastic consumers
to competition.
Overall, the ¯xed-e®ects, panel estimates provide evidence of a positive relationship
between the business cycle and price dispersion in the airline industry. Furthermore,
the results show that variations in the business cycle have a large positive e®ect on the
upper portion of the price distribution. These results are consistent with the mechanism
outlined by the model delineated in Section 2, whereby carriers raise the markup charged
to those consumers who are least price elastic during booms in the business cycle.
21We also divided the sample into two periods based on the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) business cycle dates. We found positive and signi¯cant coe±cients in each sample period,
although a larger e®ect in the ¯rst.
22All instruments were relevant at the 1 percent level as measured by the Cragg-Donald statistic.
176.1 Carrier and Consumer Heterogeneity
As discussed earlier, legacy carriers, sometimes called \hub-and-spoke carriers" or
network carriers, tend to implement di®erent pricing strategies compared to the LCCs.
For instance, some legacy carriers o®er \economy-plus," which o®ers passengers more leg
room, separate access through security, and/or early boarding. There is also evidence
from Figure 2 which suggests that LCCs have lower variability in price dispersion over the
cycle. To determine whether these di®erent types of carriers actually price di®erently
over the business cycle, we divide the sample between legacy carriers and LCCs and
re-estimate the main econometric speci¯cation for each sample separately.
The estimates divided by carrier type are reported in the top panel of Table 3 and
show that most of the e®ects from the business cycle on price dispersion in the full sample
of routes stem from the legacy carriers.23 The e®ect of the output gap on the interquartile
range is roughly two to three times the magnitude in the sample of legacy carriers ( ^ ¯1
= 2.77 compared to the estimated e®ect in the sample of LCCs ^ ¯1 = 1.03). This is
consistent with the interpretation that the pricing considerations of legacy carriers are
more sensitive to the movements in willingness-to-pay of more price inelastic consumers.
We further explore the relationship between price dispersion and business cycle con-
ditions using a subsample analysis from Gerardi and Shapiro (2009). In that paper, we
attempted to decompose the full sample of routes into those with a heterogeneous con-
sumer base and those with a more homogeneous consumer base. Since routes between
large cities tend to attract both business and leisure travelers, they tend to have a bi-
modal distribution of prices while routes to largely leisure destinations, like islands and
famous beaches, tend to have unimodal price distributions and lower median prices.24
Thus, airlines may have more opportunities to implement price discrimination strategies
on these big-city routes since they include relatively more high-income, business con-
sumers. Furthermore, note that equation (8) implies that dispersion on big-city routes
will be more sensitive to the cycle if the utility over income displays increasing relative
23For ease of view, we do not report estimates on HERFjt or cost variables. No results signi¯cantly
changed from the preceding section.
24For a full list of the cities in each sample as well as a detailed description of how these subsamples
are created see Gerardi and Shapiro (2009).
18risk aversion and less sensitive to the cycle if it displays decreasing relative risk aversion.25
The bottom two panels of Table 3 contain estimates of the correlation between the in-
terquartile range of the price distribution for a carrier-route observation and the business
cycle for big-city routes versus leisure routes. The estimates show that price dispersion is
more closely tied with the output and the city-wide unemployment rate for the big-city
route sample than the leisure sample. For instance, in the big-city, legacy carrier sample,
a one percentage point rise in the output gap is associated with a 3.6 percent increase
in the interquartile range, while it is associated with a 1.8 percent increase in the leisure
route sample. For low-cost carriers, the e®ect is 1.3 percent in the big-city sample and
0.79 percent in the leisure route sample.
7 Conclusion
Our analysis has shown that price dispersion is signi¯cantly procyclical in the airline
industry. This result suggests that markups of price over marginal cost are also pro-
cyclical, in line with the recent ¯ndings of Nekarda and Ramey (2010). The results are
consistent with a parsimonious theoretical model of second-degree price discrimination,
which shows that as long as ¯rms have the ability to price discriminate and consumers
have diminishing marginal utility of income, price dispersion will follow aggregate de-
mand. Thus, we believe our results can be extrapolated to other industries in which
price discrimination plays an important role. Overall, the analysis suggests price dis-
crimination is a risky strategy in the sense that it accentuates the degree to which the
¯rm is exposed to °uctuations in aggregate demand. We posit that this may be an addi-
tional reason why low-cost carriers, such as Southwest and JetBlue, which do not price
discriminate to the same extent as legacy carriers, have experienced more pro¯t stability
over the last two decades.
Future work on the issue could involve examining whether other microeconomic mech-
anisms are at work in determining markup cyclicality, as well as looking at industries
with di®erent types of ¯rm pricing strategies. For instance, Miller and Osborne (2010)
¯nd evidence of price discrimination in the cement industry to be based on the spatial
25This can be seen by taking the derivative of 8 with respect to yh.
19location of the consumer. In the healthcare industry, players are involved in a bargain-
ing game over price. Markup cyclicality is therefore likely distinct for certain classes of
industries.
20A Variable De¯nitions
² lnP(k)ijt - The logarithm of the kth price percentile of carrier i on route j in period
t, obtained from the DB1B.
² lnIQRijt - The logarithm of the interquartile range, given by P(75)ijt - P(25)ijt,
where P(k)ijt is the price percentile of carrier i on route j in period t, obtained
from the DB1B.
² Glodd
ijt - The Gini log-odds ratio, given by Glodd
ijt = ln(
Gij
1¡Gij), where Gijt is the Gini
coe±cient of carrier i's price distribution on route j in period t, calculated using
data from DB1B.
² lnHHIjt - The logarithm of the Her¯ndahl index of route j in period t, calculated
using passenger shares obtained from the DB1B.
² Y GAPt - The log of nominal GDP in period t minus the log of nominal potential
GDP in period t, as measured by the Congressional Budget O±ce (CBO).
² URjt - The average metropolitan unemployment rate in period t of the origin and
destination state of route j, obtained from Bureau of Labor Statitics (BLS).
² lnFUELit - The average cost per gallon fuel by carrier i in period t, obtained from
the BTS P-52 database.
² lnCOSTit - Total operating costs minus total fuel costs divided by total seat-miles
for carrier i in period t, obtained from the BTS P-52 database.
Instruments
² lnPASSRTEjt - The logarithm of total enplaned passengers on route j in period
t from the T-100 Domestic Segment Databank.
² IRUTHERF - This instrument is identical to one used by Borenstein and Rose
(1994). This variable is the square of the ¯tted value for MKTSHAREijt from
its ¯rst-stage regression, plus the rescaled sum of the squares of all other carrier's













ENPk1¤ENPk2, where k indexes all airlines, j is the observed air-
line, and ENPk1 and ENPk2 are airline k's average quarterly enplanements at
the two endpoint airports. This instrument is similar to one used by Borenstein
and Rose (1994), with the di®erence being that Borenstein and Rose use average
daily enplanements, while we use average quarterly enplanements, as a result of
data availability. Data on enplanements were obtained from the T-100 Domestic
Segment Databank.
B Data Construction
In this appendix, we discuss our methods and assumptions involved in constructing
our panel of airline-route ticket observations from the DB1B and T-100 Domestic Seg-
ment databases maintained by the BTS at their online website, Transtats. There are
three di®erent sub-components to the DB1B data set. They are market data, coupon
data, and ticket data, and we combine variables from all three sources.26
We use only domestic, coach-class itineraries and keep only tickets containing direct
°ights.27 Direct °ights typically account for 30 percent of the itineraries in the DB1B
over the course of our sample, with no apparent trend.
The BTS includes a variable that describes the reliability of each ticket price (\dollar
cred"). The variable takes on a value of 0 if the fare is of questionable magnitude, based
on a set of limits de¯ned by the BTS, and it takes a value of 1 if it is credible. We drop
all tickets for which this variable takes a value of zero.
The DB1B also provides limited information regarding the fare class of each ticket.
Each ticket is labeled as either coach-class, business-class, or ¯rst-class, and we eliminated
all ¯rst-class and business-class itineraries. Unfortunately, the DB1B does not have any
26For further reference, see the BTS's website http://www.transtats.bts.gov.
27The sample of direct °ights encompasses both non-stop °ights and °ights in which there is a stop
but no change of plane.
22direct way of identifying frequent-°yer tickets, but there are indirect methods that have
been used in the previous literature, and we follow these in our analysis. First, we drop
all fares coded as 0. Next, we dropped all fares that are less than or equal to $20 ($10
for one-way tickets).
In addition to eliminating frequent-°yer tickets and higher-class tickets, we also elimi-
nate tickets in which the operating and ticketing carriers are di®erent due to code sharing
arrangements. Code sharing is a practice where a °ight operated by an airline is jointly
marketed as a °ight for one or more other airlines. Due to the uncertainty regarding
the actual airline who is setting the price schedule in such an arrangement, we decided
to eliminate these itineraries. Code sharing ¯rst appears in the data in 1998:Q1. On
average, approximately 80 percent of the original number of direct tickets in the DB1B
is retained in the analysis.
After ¯ltering the ticket data for each quarter of the DB1B, we combined tickets from
all 55 quarters and collapsed the data into airline-route observations. For example, if
we had 10,000 United Airline tickets between Boston and Los Angeles in 1993:Q1, we
calculated summary statistics (such as the Gini coe±cient), and collapsed the data into
a single observation corresponding to a United Airlines °ight between Boston and Los
Angeles in 1993:Q1.
The merge between the DB1B and T-100 Segment databases was not exact (around
45 percent matched). First, since the DB1B does not provide complete coverage for
all airlines and routes, there are a number of direct routes in the T-100 data that we
do not ¯nd in the DB1B (especially low-volume routes). Second, the DB1B does not
allow us to distinguish between a non-stop, direct ticket and a ticket that involves a
stop without a plane change. For example, if a passenger takes a °ight from Boston to
Orlando that stops in Atlanta, but does not involve a plane change, his itinerary will
look identical to that of a passenger who °ies from Boston to Orlando without any stops.
For this reason, we identi¯ed some airline routes as direct in the DB1B, that are not non-
stop, and therefore do not have segment information in the T-100 data. While we lose
many airline-route observations during the merge as a result, we believe that this merge
actually provides a nice ¯lter, since we would ideally like to use only non-stop, direct
°ights. Thus, by merging data between the DB1B and the T-100, we likely eliminate a
23large proportion of °ights that are direct, but not non-stop due to a plane change.
In an e®ort to eliminate possible coding errors, we drop certain airline-route observa-
tions from the data that we believe do not have adequate coverage to calculate reliable
price dispersion statistics. We drop any airline-route observation that does not have at
least 100 passengers in the DB1B. Furthermore, for each airline route observation, we
calculate the average number of passengers over time in both the DB1B and the T-100
Segment databases. If the number of passengers on an airline route in a given quarter
falls below 25 percent of its mean over time in one of the databases, but not in the other,
then we drop the observation from our data, on the basis that its value is most likely
measurement error. However, if the number of passengers on an airline route in a given
quarter falls below 25 percent of its mean in both the DB1B and the T-100 Segment
databases, then we keep the observation in our data.
Finally, we addressed the issue of \double counting." Since we de¯ned a route as a
directional trip in our data, any round-trip ticket would count twice. For example, a
round-trip fare from Boston to San Francisco would appear twice in the data | once as
BOS-SFO and once as SFO-BOS. Since this would have no e®ect on the consistency of
our estimates, but a signi¯cant e®ect on the size of our standard errors, we chose to drop
one of the directions. Of course, the drawback of this assumption is that some one-way
fares were dropped from the data as a result. In our judgment, the ¯rst issue outweighed
the second issue.
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ln \ HERF 0.232*** 0.227*** 0.069*** 0.066***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.023) (0.023)
lnFUEL 0.103*** 0.087*** -0.030*** -0.040***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
lnCOST 0.194*** 0.168*** 0.465*** 0.449***
(0.059) (0.055) (0.029) (0.028)
Observations 154333 153632 155961 155254
Notes: All regressions include carrier-route-speci¯c dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses and
are clustered by route to account for both autocorrelation and correlation between carriers on the same
route. One, two, and three asterisks indicate signi¯cance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, or 1-percent




- UR 1.590*** -0.246**
(0.148) (0.100)
ln \ HERF 0.279*** 0.276*** 0.211*** 0.211***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.014) (0.014)
lnFUEL 0.073*** 0.060*** 0.112*** 0.110***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
lnCOST 0.306*** 0.286*** -0.017 -0.019
(0.032) (0.031) (0.015) (0.014)
Observations 155961 155254 155961 155254
Notes: All regressions include carrier-route-speci¯c dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses and
are clustered by route to account for both autocorrelation and correlation between carriers on the same
route. One, two, and three asterisks indicate signi¯cance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, or 1-percent
signi¯cance level, respectively.Table 3: Panel Estimates by Carrier and Route Type




- UR 2.961*** 1.867***
(0.309) (0.268)




- UR 3.684*** 2.112***
(0.550) (0.468)




- UR 1.996*** 1.361**
(0.517) (0.560)
Observations 20877 20235 10244 10229
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the interquartile range. All regressions include carrier-
route-speci¯c dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by route to account for
both autocorrelation and correlation between carriers on the same route. One, two, and three asterisks
























































Total Operating Profit  Output Gap
Notes: Total operating pro¯ts are taken from the BTS's P-12 database and includes pro¯ts for carriers
with annual operating revenues of $20 million or more. The output gap is the di®erence between
actual and potential output as measured by the Congressional Budget O±ce (CBO) and the Bureau of
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Notes: Depicted are the ten largest carriers in terms of passengers per quarter. We also included two
large LCCs, Frontier and AirTran. The within-route interquartile range (IQR) of prices was calculated
as the average (weighted by passengers for each carrier), of which we calculated the variance for each
carrier. This ¯gure uses domestic operating pro¯ts from the BTS's P-12 database.Figure 3: Pricing Dynamics




































































































































Notes: Depicted are 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th and 90th price percentiles for three airline-route observations.
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Output Gap Average Aircraft Utilization Moving Average